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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBIZON OF UTAH, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GENERAL OIL COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 
11364 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This supplemental brief is filed on behalf of the plain-
tiff and appellant pursuant to an order of this court dated 
the 17th day of April, 1969. 
The original brief of plaintiff and appellant fully sets 
forth the nature of the proceedings below, the decision of 
the trial court and the relief prayed for. In addition to the 
statement of facts contained in the original appellant's brief 
plaintiff now wishes to refer to certain other facts in the 
record, for purposes of emphasis and clarity, which may 
not be fully or clearly stated in the original brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On page 6 of plaintiff's original brief it is pointed out 
that there are conveyances of record to the plaintiff and 
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its immediate predecessor in title which tie to the southeast 
corner of Section 36 and to a point in reference to the 
east right-of-way line of the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad 
Company (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, pp. 105-106; Defendant's 
Exhibit 12). It should also be pointed out, however, that 
after plaintiff received title from Sowards, its immediate 
grantor, in 1946 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, p. 106), plaintiff 
secured from Sowards' grantors, to-wit Leithey and Cox, 
quit-claim deeds which tie to the center of Section 36, Town-
ship 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and which 
deeds ref er to the same beginning point that was used in 
the description from the patentee, James Smith, etux. to 
James A. Bean. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, p. 21) Thus, it 
should be emphasized that these quit-claim deeds from 
Leithey and Cox complete the unbroken basic chain of title 
frcm Smith, the patentee, down to the plaintiff. (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 1, pp. 112 and 113) The record stands un-
controverted on this important point. 
It should be further observed that in the deeds to 
plaintiff and to its immediate predecessor (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 1, pp. 105 and 106) the description makes specific 
reference in its first course to a definite monument, to-wit, 
a fence and the west side of a lane. (Tr. 12, 13, 35, 36; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6) Moreover, the conflict between the 
descriptions of the plaintiff's and the defendant's properties 
only arises if the location of this lane as a monument is 
ignored. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8; Tr. 16, 17, 37) In 
other words, these descriptions overlap each other if the 
metes and bounds descriptions of the two properties are 
strictly followed. (Tr. 16) 
It is also pointed out in plaintiff's original brief that 
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the original descriptions of these properties coincided per-
fectly, inasmuch as both of them were tied to the center 
of Section 36. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, page 2; plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, page 21; Tr. 56, 57, 60, 61 and 66) Moreover, 
the description in defendant's deed, under which it must 
claim title, contains references to definite and fixed monu-
ments, namely, the west line of the property of Central 
Utah Vocational School and the west line of the property 
owned by Barbizon of Utah, Inc. (Exhibit 2, pages 14 and 
15) Only by ignoring these monuments does any conflict 
exist between the property of plaintiff and defendant. (Tr. 
36-39) 
There is much evidence in the record of old fence lines. 
This is true with respect to the line between plaintiff's and 
defendant's property. Indications of these fence lines were 
observed as early as 1947. (Tr. 45, 46, 51, 54) 
Additionally, it is established without dispute in the 
record that plaintiff is the successor in title to the land 
conveyed by the patentee, Smith, to James A. Bean. (Tr. 
63) Furthermore, there is no deed out of the patentee, 
Smith, which enlarges the George Baum description 
through which defendant derives its title or which gives 
the defendant title to the land in dispute. (Exhibit 2, page 
2; Tr. 64, 66) 
The conflict in the descriptions of the properties of the 
plaintiff and defendant was created when the beginning 
point of the descriptions, apparently following a private 
survey, was changed from the center of Section 36 to the 
southeast corner of the section. (Tr. 67) The description 
in the defendant's deed exceeds the basic title of the de-
fendant by 66 feet. (Tr. 69) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE COURT THAT DEFENDANT, GENERAL OIL 
COMP ANY, IS THE OWNER OF AND ENTITLED TO 
POSSESSION OF THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE 
AND DECREED IT BY THE COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION 
UPON CIVIL NO. 19838, DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BARBIZON OF UTAH, 
INC. VS. STANFORD PATTON, ET AL. 
POINT IV. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLE-
MENT THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUDGMENT AND DECREE OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL, SHOULD 
HA VE BEEN GRANTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE COURT THAT DEFENDANT, GENERAL OIL 
COMPANY, IS THE OWNER OF AND ENTITLED TO 
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POSSESSION OF THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE 
AND DECREED IT BY THE COURT. 
In plaintiff's original brief reference is made on page 9 
to two important rules of conveyancing which must be kept 
in mind in the determination of the issues of this case. 
These are, first, that in the descriptions in deeds where 
only courses and distances, sometimes called metes and 
bounds, are used in describing the land being conveyed, 
the courses and distances or metes and bounds control. 
Edwards v. Lee, (Ky.) 61 S.W. (2d) 1049; 
Kentucky Union Co. v. Beatty, (Ky.) 
61 S.W.2d 45; 
Frost Lumber Industries v. Brantley, (Tex.) 
109 S.W.2d 999. 
These and many other decisions which could be cited hold 
that where courses and distances are used in a description 
and no monuments are called for, courses and distances 
prevail and are to be given great weight. Second, where 
deeds do not contain any ambiguity regarding the intention 
of the parties, no evidence is admissible outside the deed 
itself as to such intention. 
Finlayson v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co., 110 Ut. 319, 172 P.2d 142; 
12 Am. Jur.2d, p. 548, Sec. 2; 
23 Am. Jur.2d, p. 287, Sec. 250. 
In addition to the case of Appeal of Moore, cited on 
page 11 of the plaintiff's original brief, see also 
Wagner v. Thompson, 163 Kan. 662, 186 P.2d 278, 
and 
Beans v. Worth, 201Kan.173, 438 P.2d 957. 
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Beans cites with approval Moore's holding that "an official 
survey merely establishes corners and boundary lines. It 
does not determine title to property in dispute." 
In Velasquez v. Cox, 50 N. Mex. 338, 176 P.2d 909, 
plaintiff sought to claim title to a piece of land by reason 
cf an independent survey made many years after the 
original survey under which the defendant claimed title. 
That court held that independent surveys which do not 
conform to original surveys are not binding upon the 
owners of patented lands claiming under an original survey. 
These cases support the plaintiff's pDsition that a deed 
based upon a private survey such as the one relied upon 
by the defendant, which changed the beginning point in a 
description from one quarter section corner to another, 
could not under any circumstances enlarge the defendant's 
title so as to give it land which could not be claimed by its 
predecessor in title outside of and beyond the basic title 
upon which the defendant's title must rest. This is exactly 
the effect which the court's judgment accomplished in this 
case. 
On page 12 of plaintiff's original brief reference is 
made to the deeds under which the defendant and its 
immediate predecessor held its title, a description which 
specifically refers to plaintiff's west property line as a 
boundary, and which limited defendant's title to the plain-
tiff's west property line. The fact that such deed by courses 
and distances, if strictly followed, might go beyond that 
boundary line called for by the defendant's deed is imma-
terial. Whenever there is a conflict between courses and 
distances and boundaries or monuments, the former must 
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yield to the latter. This is so well established in the 
decisions of this court as to be beyond dispute. 
Thus, in Johnson Real Estate Co. v. Niel,son, 10 Vt.2d 
380, 353 P.2d 918, it was held: 
"* * * Where calls in a deed give an initial point 
and * * * thence to some other natural monument * * * 
or * * * any other fixed monument * * * the distance 
call yields to the monument call." 
See, also, 
Scott v. Hansen, 18 Vt.2d 303, 422 P.2d 525; 
Bullion Beck & Champion Mining Co. v. Eureka 
Hill Mining Co., 36 Vt. 429, 103 P. 881; 
Giauque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Vt. 89, 129 P. 429; 
Finlayson v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co., 
supra. 
In Finlayson it was specifically held that an "artificial" 
monument would take precedence over a metes and bounds 
description in a conveyance if a conflict existed between 
the two. 
As heretofore indicated, plaintiff's Exhibit 2, pages 
14 and 15, shows on its face that defendant's title is limited 
to plaintiff's west property line (Tr. 43) This is true 
irrespective of where the calls for courses and distances 
might lead and further assuming that they, if strictly 
followed, would include the property in dispute in this case. 
The rule that monuments control over courses and distances 
prevails in most, if not all, jurisdictions. 
11 C.J.S. 2d, p. 614, Sec. 51. 
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In American Law of Property, Vol. 3, Sec. 12.117, p. 
444, the author says: 
"* * * Generally, from the cases cited, when a 
description is by courses and distances, with designa-
tion of natural or artificial monuments making points 
or lines in the boundaries described, the lines will run 
to or along those monuments as the case may be, even 
if departure must be made from the courses or dis-
tances, or both, in order to do so. * * *" 
The foregoing authorities amply support the plaintiff's 
contention that the court's finding No. 3 (R. 46) is not 
supported by the evidence, for the obvious reason, that, 
although the plaintiff received a deed from Sowards, (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit l, p. 106) which contains a description which 
may be found in no other place in plaintiff's chain of title, 
it is not true and, is in fact, contrary to the evidence, that 
this is the only description which could support plaintiff's 
position in any way. The Sowards deed is supplemented 
and supported by the deeds subsequently obtained from 
Sowards' grantors, namely, Leithey and Cox. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, pp. 112 and 113) Moreover, as already pointed 
out, this finding ignores the title line specifically ref erred 
to in defendant's own deed which limits the boundary of 
defendant's property to plaintiff's west boundary line. 
(Exhibit 2, p. 114) This line was already established and 
in existence prior to the deed to defendant or its prede-
cessor. 
It is reversible error for a trial court to make findings 
which are not supported by the evidence in the record or 
which are contrary to the evidence. 
In Parker v. Weber County Irrigation Dist., 68 Ut. 472, 
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251 P. 11, this court reversed the judgment of a trial court 
which was based upon findings contrary to uncontradicted 
evidence in the record. 
In addition see also 
Green v. Palfreyman, 109 Ut. 291, 166 P.2d 215; 
Jewell v. Hainer, 12 Ut.2d 328, 366 P.2d 594; 
String/ ellow v. Botterill Auto, 63 Ut. 56, 
221 P. 861; 
In Re Tarrant's Estate, 38 Cal.2d 42, 
237 P. 505; and 
Richens v. Struhs, 17 Ut.2d 356, 412 P.2d 314. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION 
UPON CIVIL NO. 19838, DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BARBIZON OF UTAH, 
INC. VS. STANFORD PATTON, ET AL. 
On page 15 of plaintiff's original brief in this case 
reference is made to the fact that the lower court, in de-
ciding this case, purported to rely upon a decision rendered 
in an earlier case involving the question of which of two 
grantees would prevail when they claimed under a common 
grantor and the properties described in those deeds were 
in conflict with each other. From the testimony of the 
witness, Garrett, it is conclusively established that case 
No. 19838 was between Patton and the plaintiff, and that 
the decision in that case was that the grantee who claimed 
under a deed prior in date and recording should prevail. 
(Tr. 73) No claim is made by plaintiff that the decision 
in case No. 19838 was incorrect. The correctness of that 
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decision is supported by elementary principles of property 
law. 
Thompson on Real Property, 1963 Rev., Sec. 4421, states 
the general rule applicable to such a state of facts: 
... ~ * * h d k · w ere a ven or ma es two conveyances 
of the same land to innocent purchasers, neither having 
notice of the other's claim * * * the one who secures 
priority in recording has the valid title." 
See, also, Elsey v. Shaw, (Okla.) 198 P.2d 439. 
This rule is part of the statutory law of the State of 
Utah-Sec. 57-3-3 U.C.A. 1953. 
Conceding the correctness of the ruling in case No. 
19838, the fact remains that the issues in that case and 
in the one here under consideration were not the same, 
and consequently the applicable legal principles are dif-
ferent. 
The trial court's finding No. 2 specifically states that 
the court considered the evidence and exhibits in case No. 
19838. The evidence and the exhibits in that case were 
never offered in evidence by the defendant. For this reason 
it is impossible to determine from the record before this 
court what the evidence and exhibits were which the court 
considered in case No. 19838 which compelled a judgment 
in defendant's favor in this case. There was no attempt 
made to show that the issues in case No. 19838 were the 
same as those involved in this case. Moreover, the only 
evidence before the court as to the issues involved in case 
No. 19838 is affirmatively to the effect that those issues 
were not the same as the issues involved in this case. (Tr. 
73) 
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It has been held in many cases that testimony or evi-
dence given in another proceeding is not admissible where 
the issues involved in the other proceeding were substan-
tially different from the issues before the court in the 
subsequent proceeding. 
Stockgrowers State Bank v. Schultz (Wyo.) 
276 P. 532; 
Kuck v. Raftery, (Cal.) 4 P.2d 552. 
In Stockgrowers, supra, the court affirmed the refusal 
of the trial court to admit testimony given in another 
proceeding by stating: 
"In our judgment this ruling was correct, as that 
action was between parties other than those in the 
present litigation, and the issues were totally dissimi-
lar." (Emphasis added) 
By its finding No. 2 the trial court further found 
that defendant is the owner and in possession of the prop-
erty described in the answer and the complaint of the 
defendant in case No. 29707. These statements are mere 
conclusions and do not constitute the finding of any fact 
upon which a legal conclusion could be based. 
In Giauque v. Salt Lake City, supra, it was held that 
a trial court is bound to make findings which conform to 
the issues in the case before it and that a failure to make 
findings on all the issues is error. This court said: 
"* * * It is the duty of the trial court, and they 
should see to it, that in the preparation of findings, 
they respond to the issues, and that upon all material 
questions, either affirmative or, in case there is no 
evidence, negative findings be made." 
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It is submitted that there is no evidence in the record 
in this case to support the court's finding No. 2. Nowhere 
does it appear that the defendant was in possession of the 
property called for by plaintiff's deeds and record title 
' nor when that ownership or possession began. On the other 
hand, the evidence is undisputed that defendant has never 
been in physical possession of the property in dispute. 
(Tr. 40, 43, 46) The court's finding No. 2 stating that 
defendant is the owner and in possession of the property 
in dispute ignores the monuments ref erred to in defendant's 
own deed which limit the metes and bounds description to 
the boundary of the Vocational School property and the 
west property line of Barbizon of Utah. (Exhibit 2, page 
14; Tr. 38 and 39) As has heretofore been stated, the 
Barbizon deed was prior in time and recording to the deed 
by which the defendant acquired its title. Plaintiff's deed 
from Sowards was dated October 28, 1946, and was recorded 
the same day. (Exhibit 1, p. 106) Defendant's deed, on 
the other hand, was dated about March 24, 1959, which 
is its date of acknowledgment, and was recorded March 26, 
1959. (Exhibit 2, p. 14) Moreover, the evidence is un-
disputed that plaintiff's Exhibit 1 shows that plaintiff is 
the successor in interest to the property described in the 
deed to James A. Bean. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, p. 21) Fur-
thermore, it is undisputed that neither defendant nor any 
of its predecessors obtained a deed or conveyance including 
any part of the property covered by the James A. Bean 
deed. (Tr. 64, 65, 66) 
In view of the foregoing, a finding is compelled that 
the court's finding of fact No. 2 is not supported by the 
evidence. 
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POINT IV. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT. 
It is the duty of the trial court to make findings on 
all material issues, either affirmative or negative. 
Giauque v. Salt Lake City, supra; 
Baker v. Hatch, 70 Ut. l, 257 P. 673; 
Baird v. Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 
70 Ut. 57, 257 P. 1060; 
LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 
18 Ut. 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615. 
Furthermore, the court's findings must be supported by the 
evidence. 
Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Ut. 91, 
151 P. 543; 
Jankele v. Texas Company, 88 Ut. 325, 54 P.2d 425. 
Furthermore, failure to find on an issue is reversible error. 
Mendelson v. Roland, 66 Ut. 487, 243 P. 798; 
Piper v. Eakle, 78 Ut. 342, 344 P.2d 909. 
Measured by these principles, an examination of the 
court's findings discloses them to be insufficient to support 
the court's conclusions and judgment as a matter of law. 
These findings merely recite that plaintiff and defen-
dant each had a survey made, which surveys cannot be 
reconciled; that previous decisions based upon surveys 
which tie to the railroad right of way are accurate and 
that defendant's survey which ties to the railroad right 
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of way as made by defendant's surveyor is more reliable. 
There is no finding of any fact which shows that defendant's 
title is superior to plaintiff's. The finding made by the 
court ignores completely that plaintiff claimed under a 
deed which is also tied to the railroad right of way; (Ex-
hibit 1, p. 106) that plaintiff claims under an unbroken 
chain of title from the patentee (Tr. 63; Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1) ; and that defendant's deed (Exhibit 2, pages 14 and 15) 
specifically limits the defendant's east boundary to the 
west line of plaintiff's property. 
This finding, furthermore, fails to identify the deci-
sions upon which the court found as a fact that surveys 
which tie to the railroad right of way are more accurate 
and more substantial than surveys which do not so tie. 
The findings also ignore the survey which was made 
by Carr F. Greer, wherein he located the physical features 
on the ground, and particularly the west line of a certain 
lane, fences, the railroad track and the mill race (Tr. 14) 
and made plats which show the deed lines of the property 
claimed by plaintiff and defendant (Tr. 30-39). 
The finding further ignores the undisputed evidence 
that defendant's chain of title contains no deed which in 
any way enlarges the property described in Exhibit 2, page 
2, which is the only deed upon which defendant can base 
its claim to the property in dispute, and that defendant 
has no basic title to the property in dispute. (Tr. 64-69) 
There is no finding that, lacking a basic title to the 
property in dispute, there is any other evidence which would 
support the defendant's claim of title. The findings of the 
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court further completely ignore the evidence that the monu-
ments called for in defendant's deed limit defendant's 
property to plaintiff's west property line. Only by going 
beyond those monuments do the courses and distances called 
for in defendant's deed support its contention that the 
property in dispute belongs to the defendant. (Tr. 66) 
The findings also ignore the evidence that if the origi-
nal beginning point in the descriptions from the patentee, 
Smith, to Baum and Bean are used, both of which began 
at the center of Section 36, that there is no conflict between 
the property of the plaintiff and defendant and that only 
when the beginning point was changed by later surveys 
from the center of Section 36 to the southeast corner of 
said section does any conflict between the property of plain-
tiff and defendant arise. (Tr. 66-67) If the center of 
Section 36 is used as a beginning point, which plaintiff 
asserts must be done, then the property in dispute belongs 
to the plaintiff and not the defendant. 
Finding No. 2 by also stating as a fact that defendant 
is in possession of the property described in its answer and 
in its complaint in case No. 29707, ignores the undisputed 
evidence that the defendant had no access to the property 
in dispute and, consequently, there is no basis for any 
finding of defendant's possession. (Tr. 40) 
What the court should have found was that the plain-
tiff was in possession of the land called for by its deed ; 
that the taxes on the property were assessed to the plaintiff 
and were paid by the plaintiff. (Exhibits 14 and 15) 
In addition to the foregoing, the record shows, as 
16 
heretofore pointed out, that the deed under which plaintiff 
claims is prior in time and recording to the deed under 
which the defendant claims. (Exhibit 1, p. 106; Exhibit 2, 
pp. 14 and 15) There is a well established rule that there 
is a presumption that one claiming property covered by a 
deed is presumed to be in possession of the property de-
scribed in the deed. This principle is recognized in the 
laws of the State of Utah in Sec. 78-12-7 U.C.A. 1953, which 
states: 
"In every action for the recovery of real property, 
or the possession thereof, the person establishing a 
legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereof within the time required by 
law; and the occupation of the property by any other 
person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that 
the property has been held and possessed adversely to 
such legal title for seven years before the commence-
ment of the action." 
The decisions of many states recognize this rule and 
hold that if one is in possession of any part of the land 
described in his deed it is presumed that he is in possession 
of all of the property described therein. 
In St. Mary Parish Land Company v. State Mineral 
Board (La.) 167 So.2d 509, the court said: 
"Plaintiff alleged that it has a recorded deed to 
the property in question and that it is possessing it 
under the deed. We have a well recognized principle 
in this state that one who possesses any part of prop-
erty acquired in a recorded deed, is presumed to possess 
the whole of the property described therein. It natu-
rally follows, according to this principle, that the 
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plaintiff is presumed to be in possession of all of the 
property described in its deed, including water bot-
toms, if any. It is therefore entitled to seek to be 
quieted in its possession thereof." 
To the same effect see Goen v. Sansbury, 219 Md. 289, 
149 A.2d 17, wherein that court said in a case involving 
a claim of adverse possession: 
"This court has decided that the possession of part 
of a tract of land by the rightful owner is constructive 
possession of the whole as against one claiming the 
whole under color of title, except as to the part actually 
occupied by the claimant." 
In Houghton County v. Massie, 215 Mich. 654, 184 N.W. 
446, defendant was claiming title by adverse possession 
against the record owner of the land. The court held that 
the reccrd owner was deemed to be in possession and stated: 
"The plaintiff, having title of record to the land, 
is deemed in law to be in seizin and possession thereof. 
Such seizin is coextensive with the right and continues 
until the owner is ousted by adverse possession of 
another." 
There is no claim in this case that defendant is assert-
ing any claim to the disputed property by adverse possession. 
Consequently, defendant must fail upon the principle that 
plaintiff is presumed to be in possession of all of the land 
called for by its prior deed. 
The whole of defendant's claim to the property in 
dispute is based solely upon the assertion that the defendant 
could by an arbitrary, private survey, change the descrip-
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tion called for by the de€ds of its predecessors and thereby 
enlarge its title to include land to which it has no basic title. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLE-
MENT THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUDGMENT AND DECREE OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
After the trial court made its findings, conclusions 
and judgment (R. 35-37) plaintiff filed its motion request-
ing the trial court to amend and supplement its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 42-44) This motion was 
denied. (R. 18) The authorities cited under Point IV of 
this supplemental brief fully support the contentions of the 
plaintiff that it was entitled to the additional and supple-
mental findings requested, even though this would have 
resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff and against the 
defendant. 
The case of Thomas v. Clayton Piano Company, supra 
specifically holds that in a case tried to the court without 
a jury the court should find the facts on every issue, either 
affirmatively or negatively, as the evidence may be, and 
thus give the defeated party an opportunity to appeal the 
finding as not being supported by the evidence. This the 
trial court in this case has refused to do. 
It has been pointed out herein and in the plaintiff's 
original brief that each of the requested amendments and 
supplemental findings are in fact supported by evidence 
which is uncontradicted. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court below is not supported by 
the evidence in the record. And, on the other hand, said 
record and evidence shows as a matter of law that said 
judgment should be reversed and a decree entered quieting 
the title of the plaintiff to the property in dispute against 
all the claims, demands and pretensions of the defendant. 
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